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Are Law and Morality Distinct?
William A. Edmundson*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The relation of law and morality is difficult to define, but is of
great importance. The relation is often treated as a conceptual one, and
discussion of it raises troubling issues such as whether the law can ever
require what is morally repugnant, or whether there is any moral requirement to obey the law simply because it is the law. These conceptual issues are important, but are separable from the one I want to
explore here, which is whether there can be valid moral requirements
that cannot validly be made requirements of law. The issue I want to
examine is not so much one about what "law" and "morality" mean as
it is about turf - is there (can there be) any department of conduct
that morality claims as exclusively its own, and which the law has no
business penetrating? The view that there are some moral wrongs that
the law cannot properly right is tacitly and sometimes explicitly assumed by many participants in the ever-intensifying debate about
privacy. 1
In what follows I will use the term "strongly delegalized moral
requirements" to refer to the putative class of moral requirements that
are forbidden by morality itself to become legal requirements. Some
moral requirements may be only "weakly" delegalized because the
moral requirements that "delegalize" them do so only contingently. For
example, utilitarian moral concerns might delegalize a certain moral
requirement if the social costs of legal enforcement outweighed the benefits. In such a case, the requirement in question would be delegalized
but only weakly so, because a shift in the balance of costs and benefits
* Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Mississippi School of Law. Antioch College,
B.A.; University of California, Berkeley, Ph.D.; Duke University, J.D. Thanks are due to James
Peterman and Michael Hoffheimer, for their suggestions, and to Bonnie Steinbock and Ferdie
Schoenman, for their provocations. Each is blameless for my errors.
I. The landmarks of the constitutional progress of this debate are Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965), Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973) and Bowers v Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). For recent discussion of the underlying
issues, see Symposium, Law, Community, and Moral Reasoning, 77 CALIF. L. REv. 475 (1989).
For a vivid characterization of competing viewpoints and the breadth of issues at stake, see P.
Carrington, A Senate of Five: An Essay on Sexuality and the Law, 23 GA. L. REV. 859 (1989).
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is always possible and would remove the barrier of delegalization.
Strongly delegalized moral requirements, on the other hand, are those
whose delegalization is a matter of principle, rather than of policy. 2
Liberals and libertarians have a forensic if not a theoretical stake
in defending the view that strongly delegalized moral requirements exist. Liberalism holds that individual liberty is a paramount value, and
that legal curtailment of an individual's liberty to act. is morally justified only if her conduct might cause harm to others, or produce undesirable consequences of other kinds. A liberal need not claim that delegalized moral requirements exist, or are possible, for a liberal might
hold that nothing can be a moral requirement unless harm to others, or
some other consequentialist concern, so warrants. A liberal might, in
other words, hold what Joel Feinberg calls a "perfect coincidence"
view, according to which something like a Millian harm principle defines the territory of both the moral and the permissibly legal. 3 The
perfect coincidence view entails that strongly delegalized moral requirements do not exist.
Many liberals (but, as I point out below, not Mill himself) reject
the perfect coincidence view. They are reluctant to claim that their
principles circumscribe morality as well as law because to do so extends
the territory they must defend and thus tends to diminish the overall
2. For an elaboration of the distinction between "policy" and "principle" see R. DwoRKIN,
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, 22-28, 90-100 (1977) [hereinafter TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY]. In
this discussion, I will mean by "law" the set of all legal requirements (existing in one place at a
time) and by "morality" the set of all moral requirements (existing at that place at that time).
Legal and moral requirements are distinguishable by the fact that there are state-maintained
mechanisms for enforcing the former, but not necessarily the latter, type of requirement. As the
discussion in section V., infra, makes evident, membership in the category of legal requirement is
broader than what might at first appear. The term "moral requirement" is meant roughly to
invoke what Lon Fuller has called "the morality of duty," as contrasted to "the morality of aspiration." See L. FULLER, THE MoRALITY OF LAw 5-6 (rev. ed. 1969).
3. See J. FEINBERG, HARMLESS WRONGDOING at 124-25 (1988). Feinberg himself rejects
the "perfect coincidence" view, see id. at 153-54, but many liberals do not. For example, Dworkin
apparently does not, see TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY at 253, and Anthony Woozley certainly does
not, see "Law and the Legislation of Morality" in ETHICS IN HARD TIMES (A. Caplan & D.
Callahan, eds. 1981). Other authors have expressed skepticism about the general project of divid!ng morality into a part that may permissibly be legally enforced and a part that cannot. See
Nagel, The Enforcement of Morals, HuMANIST, May/June 1968 at 18-27; J\1. GoLDING, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW at 67 (1975). A point made by both Dworkin and Woozley is that counting
something as a genuine moral requirement presupposes the existence of supporting reasons, and
that these reasons in the absence of some bar might quite legitimately be weighed by a legislature.
This point is not decisive, however, for the existence of such a bar remains a possibility -one
which might be explained, e.g., in terms of Razian "exclusionary reasons." See J. RAz, THE
AUTHORITY OF LAW 16-17 (1979). My overall argument is designed to show that the existence of
such a bar would be incompatible with the existence of the range of morally permissible forms of
social enforcement which, I claim in section III, attach to any genuine moral requirement.
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plausibility of their view. To convince a popular audience,• it is more
effective to say, for example, that consensual sado-masochism is morally
wrong but beyond the law's proper reach, than to say that it is morally
permissible and therefore beyond the law's proper reach. 6 Consequently, some liberals (explicitly or otherwise) take the position that
there exist strongly delegalized moral requirements, and what I would
like to explore is the question: What account can be given of such
requirements?
I will argue that no one can convincingly maintain that something
is a moral requirement unless she is willing to recognize a range of
morally permissible measures designed to correct individual failures to
observe that requirement. One who believes that strongly delegalized
moral requirements are possible has to give an account not only of how
such requirements arise and find rational support, but also of the range
of morally permissible, nonlegal corrective measures that must be associated with them. It is unclear how a liberal, for example, can give the
first sort of account because such an account will have to be congenial
to the priority of liberty and the harm principle, and yet not so congenial that the requirement in question is legalizable. But even if such an
account can be given, the liberal will find it difficult to give a plausible
account of the contours of morally permissible, necessarily non-legal
correction.
In particular, I will argue that on Mill's account of social enforcement a less oppressive legal corrective is always conceivable, and that
therefore the question whether the values of individual liberty and autonomy are better served by legal or by non-legal correction is always
to be decided according to the particulars of the case. I conclude, then,
that liberals (and everyone else) ought to accept the "perfect coincidence" view. But accepting this conclusion is not costless; for, when
4. Michael J. Sandel has recently distinguished "naive" and "sophisticated" types of argument for, or against, morals legislation. See Sandel, Moral Argument and Liberal Toleration:
Abortion and Homosexuality, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 521 (1989). According to Sandel, naive arguments "hold[] that the justice of laws depends on the moral worth of the conduct they prohibit or
protect," while sophisticated arguments "bracket" substantive moral issues and invoke "a more
general theory about the respective claims of majority rule and individual rights . . . . " /d. For
sophisticated advocates of such legislation, bracketing means letting the majority decide; for sophisticated opponents, it means letting the individual decide. Each of these adversaries appeals to a
"more general theory" to support its favored decisionmaker. One central point of the present
article, expressed in Sandelian terms, is that the "more general theory" that sophisticated liberals
invoke often involves an implicit or explicit denial of the perfect coincidence view.
5. According to a recent The New York Times/CBS News Poll, 68o/o of 978 adults polled
"say that even in cases where they might think abortion is wrong, the government has no business
preventing a woman from having an abortion." And 35% of "those who say abortion is murder
and never the best course, even in a bad situation [20% of all respondents]'' also say that preventing abortion is "no business" of the state. See The N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1989, at 10, col. 1.
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specific issues of morals legislation arise, the "perfect coincidence" view
requires those taking a liberal position to face the potentially awkward
dilemma of having either to contradict popular moral notions or to admit that their opposition to legal enforcement is based only on grounds
of policy, not of moral principle.
Because Mill is such a central figure in the liberal tradition, it will
be illuminating first to explore his view.

II.

MILL's VIEw

The idea that there is an area of morality that is "not the law's
business" 6 is usually traced to Mill. Mill does, in the Introduction to
On Liberty, speak of "rules of conduct ... imposed ... by opinion ...
which are not fit subjects for the operation of law ," 7 and of "a legitimate sphere of legal control" 8 and to "what things are fit to be done by
a government." 9 And, in the fourth chapter, Mill distinguishes a category of conduct which, though "hurtful to others or wanting in due
consideration for their welfare" does not violate "any of their constituted rights," in which case "[t]he offender may then be justly punished
by opinion, though not by law." 10 These passages suggest that Mill's
view was that delegalized -and perhaps strongly delegalized- moral
requirements indeed exist. But Mill generally argues that the "harm"
principle defines not only a limit beyond which law may not pass, but
also a limit to morality, so the issue requires investigating.
Mill divides personal faults into two categories. Members of the
first concern the actor's "own good" but do not affect the interests of
others, and therefore never merit social punishment although they may
occasion the "disagreeable consequence" that others in their liberty may
shun the actor's company, hold him in disesteem, and pass him over in
the distribution of "optional good offices" not tending to his self-improvement.11 Into this category Mill places folly, "lowness or depravation of taste," rashness, obstinacy, self-conceit, immoderation, self-indulgence and cupidity. 12 Mill adds that these "are not properly
immoralities and, to whatever pitch they may be carried, do not consti6. This indelible phrase appears in paragraph 257 of the REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON
HOMOSEXUAL OFFENSES AND PROSTITUTION (CMD 247) (1957), commonly known as the
WoLFENDEN REPORT.
7. jOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY at 8 (C. Shields, ed. 1956) [hereinafter ON LIBERTY].
8. /d. at 12.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 91-92.
11. Id. at 94.
12. Id.

33]

LAW AND MORALITY

37

tute wickedness." 13 To fit Mill's claim into the terminology I am using,
doing what is for one's own good is never per se morally required.
Faults of the second category affect others, and are "fit objects of
moral reprobation and, in grave cases, of moral retribution and punishment."14 To this category belong rights violations, unjustified injury
and "unfair or ungenerous use of advantages over [others]; even selfish
abstinence from defending them from injury." 111 Dispositions to such
conduct -such as cruelty, malice, envy, insincerity, irascibility, greed
and self-conceit- are also "properly immoral and fit subjects of disapprobation which may rise to abhorrence.m 6 But nothing is "socially
obligatory unless circumstances render [it] at the same time [a] dut[y] to
others." 17 In other words, "moral disapprobation in the proper sense of
the term" is appropriate only where conduct "violate[s] a distinct and
assignable obligation to any other person." 18 Mill's puzzling summary
is this: "Whenever, in short, there is a definite damage, or a definite
risk of damage, either to an individual or to the public, the case is taken
out of the province of liberty and placed in that of morality or law.m 9
The disjunction, "morality or law," suggests that Mill felt these
provinces to be distinct, but he gives no indication that different principles should operate in the two provinces, and every indication that in
each province the decision, whether to sanction conduct and to what
degree, is governed by the answer to the general question "whether the
general welfare will or will not be promoted by interfering with
it. . . . " 20 Mill makes it nearly certain that his view does not recognize
strongly delegalized moral requirements, when, in the concluding chapter of On Liberty, he states the maxim that: "for such actions as are
prejudicial to the interests of others, the individual is accountable and
may be subject either to social or to legal punishment if society is of the
opinion that the one or the other is requisite for its protection. " 21
In Mill's view the choice of remedies requires a calculation and
comparison of the expected utilities of the available means and agencies. Once the harm principle justifies a sanction, Mill gives no hint
13. /d. at 96. Although Mill believed most strenuously in the virtue of self-improvement, he
seems uncomfortable with the terms "duties to ourselves" and "duty to oneself." See id.
14. /d. at 95.
15. /d.
16. /d.
17. /d. at 96.
18. !d. at 99. The existence of "a distinct and assignable obligation" to another is not, for
Mill, a necessary feature of the duties of morality in general, as distinct from the duties of justice.
See j.S. MILL, UTILITARIANISM 304-05 (Warnock ed. 1962) [hereinafter UTILITARIANISM].
19. ON LIBERTY at 100.
20. /d. at 92.
21. /d. at 114 (emphasis added).
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that any principle dictates an a priori preference for private as against
state enforcement. Once the harm principle has been satisfied, the question of sanction is to be settled solely on grounds of utility, "the ultimate appeal on all ethical questions." 22 As Mill put it in his
"Introduction":
If anyone does an act hurtful to others, there is a prima facie case for
punishing him by law or, where legal penalties are not safely applicable, by general disapprobation.... In all things which regard the
external relations of the individual, he is de jure amenable to those

whose interests are concerned, and, if need be, to society as their protector. There are often good reasons for not holding him to the responsibility; but these reasons must arise from the special expediencies of the case: either because it is a kind of case in which he is on
the whole likely to act better when left to his own discretion than
when controlled by any way in which society have it in their power to
control him; or because the attempt to exercise control would produce
other evils, greater than those which it would prevent. 18
What, in Mill's view, distinguishes legal and merely social means
of enforcing rules of conduct? He wrote:
Society can and does execute its own mandates [as opposed to those
issued "by the hands of its political functionaries"]; and if it issues
wrong mandates instead of right, or any mandates at all in things
with which it ought not to meddle, it practices a social tyranny more
formidable than many kinds of political oppression, since, though not
usually upheld by such extreme penalties, it leaves fewer means of
escape, penetrating much more deeply into the details of life, and
enslaving the soul itself. 24
The contrast Mill draws is multidimensional, but nonetheless one
of degree. "Civil penalties" are usually (but not always) more extreme
than those of "prevailing opinion and feeling," but the latter are much
harder to elude, much more minutely pervasive and are much more
corrosive of individual personality. 211 No wonder that Mill repeatedly
announces that he intends his "one very simple principle" to set a limit
to both legal and social control of the individuai.26
Strongly delegalized moral requirements seem possible because the
characteristics of being a legal requirement and of being a merely
22. /d. at 14.
23. /d. at 15 (emphasis added). Cf UTILITARIANISM at 303.
24. ON LIBERTY at 7 (emphasis added).
25. /d.
26. /d. at 13.
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moral requirement differ. 27 Legal requirements are coercively
enforceable by some state-regulated mechanism; merely moral requirements are not necessarily coercively enforceable, although some probably are. It may be helpful to make two distinctions explicit. Any requirement of conduct may permissibly be enforced either through solely
suasive (i.e., sub-coercive) means, or through coercive means such as
physical compulsion and threats thereof. 28 This is a distinction between
permissible means of enforcement, and it corresponds roughly to what
Mill had in mind when he distinguished civil penalties and punishment
"by opinion." Further, any requirement of conduct may be enforced
privately only, or it may be enforced by the state. This is a distinction
between permissible agents of enforcement, and it is one to which Mill
gave less attention, for he felt that society had come in either case to be
the ultimate agent of enforcement.
The two distinctions cut across each other and, for any requirement of conduct, create four possibilities: A requirement may be privately suasively enforceable, suasively enforceable by the state, privately
coercively enforceable, or coercively enforceable by the state. A further
division within the category of the state's coercive means must be noted,
viz., between regulatory and criminal coercive measures. A map of the
resulting territory looks like this:
AGENTS
Private

State

Suasive

MEANS
Regulatory
Coercive
Criminal

27. According to Louis Schwartz, co-author, with Herbert Wechsler, of the MoDEL PENAL
ConE OF THE AMERICAN LAw INSTITUTE, "Moral demands on human behavior can be higher
than those of the criminal law precisely because violations of those higher standards do not carry
the grave consequences of penal offenses." Schwartz' observation pertained to the ALI's recommendation on abortion, and he went on to remark that, "Moreover, moral standards in this area
are in a state of flux, with wide disagreement among honest and reasonable people." Schwartz,
Morals Offenses and the Model Penal Code, 63 CoLUM. L. REv. 669, 685 (1963) (citing MonEL
PENAL ConE § 207.11, comment 1 at 150-51 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959)). Schwartz' latter remark
undermines the assumption implicit in the former that a genuine moral demand is at issue.
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In section III, following, I will argue that nothing can be a moral
requirement unless it can be located somewhere in this matrix. In section IV, I will try to show that it is implausible that the state should be
barred by moral principle from employing the means of enforcement
available to private actors. This is, I think, readily shown where coercive means are privately available. Where the only privately available
means of enforcement are suasive, however, complications arise. These
have to do with the fact that the state often cannot occupy the special
roles whose occupants are in many instances the only morally allowable
voices of suasion and complaint, and have also to do with the fact that
in any event the state seldom confines itself to purely suasive means.
Therefore, in section V, I try to show that from a Millian standpoint
the moral grounds that justify private suasive enforcement also justify
some form of state regulatory enforcement. In section VI, I will argue
that regulatory and criminal enforcement cannot be distinguished in
any way that would enable one to hold that there are moral requirements which the state may enforce by regulation but not by
criminalization.
III.

ARE UNENFORCEABLE MoRAL REQUIREMENTS PossiBLE?

It is typically true of moral requirements that transgressions will
create in some other person a grievance; but this is not always true. 29
Invariably, however, a moral requirement incumbent on a given person
carries with it a moral permission of some sort, on someone's part, to
persuade that person to comply, and also carries with it a moral permission on someone's part to remonstrate if the requirement is not observed. If some such morally permissible persuasion and chastisement
were not carried along, I think it would be false to suppose that the
relevant moral requirement existed. 30
28. For the sake of simplicity of exposition I have assumed that "coerc:on" and "suasion" are
distinguishable by reference to the presence or absence of a threat of some sort of physical compulsion. This assumption certainly requires more elaboration and defense than I am able to give here,
but it will be sufficient for present purposes.
29. Mill noted the use of the terms "perfect" and "imperfect" to distinguish between duties
that do and duties that do not entail a correlative individual right to compel performance. See
UTILITARIANISM at 305. Derek Parfit, in his REASONS AND PERSONS 357-61 (1984) sets out a
now-famous example of a wrong giving rise to no grievance. A couple know that if they have a
child now there is a risk that it will have a defect, but that the risk will pass if they wait. The
couple decide to have a child now rather than wait, or are careless then decide not to induce an
abortion. The child is born with a handicap that a later-born child would not have had; but of
course the child that is born would not exist at all had its parents followed advice. So long as the
child's life is at least barely worth living, the child has no grievance against its parents for their
conduct.
30. A baffling passage in Mill makes me hesitate to count him as in agreement. In Urn.ITA-
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How could this not be true? The "disagreeable consequences" of
being disesteemed, unrecommended, shunned and passed over might
conceivably be all that morality permits to be visited upon those who
omit moral requirements. But Mill thought that where morally permissible correction is so limited, what is at issue is not "social obligation"
and that the correction itself does not express "moral disapprobation in
the proper sense of the term." Unless a wholly self-concerning31 moral
requirement is an intelligible possibility (which I doubt), it is difficult
to understand how morality can both impose a genuine requirement of
conduct and insulate the actor from the only independent means of
knowing that and how her conduct varies from what is required.
Working out such a hypothesis is not so very different from trying to
imagine the world-view of a tribe, one of whose tabus is: Never correct
what anyone says. Unless such a tribe were very lucky, its world-view
would be hopelessly indeterminate even to itself. 32
I take it then that nothing can be a genuine moral requirement
unless its omission is connected somehow with permissible suasion and
remonstrance from sources other than the actor's conscience. Some
other or others must therefore have a sufficient interest in what the
RIANISM, he wrote:
[T]he idea of a penal sanction, which is the essence of law, enters not only into the
conception of injustice, but into that of any kind of wrong. We do not call anything
wrong, unless we mean to imply that a person ought to be punished in some way or
other for doing it; if not by law, by the opinion of his fellow creatures; if not by opinion, by the reproaches of his own conscience.
ld. at 303-04 (emphasis added). The concluding clause involves "a step of some magnitude," as
H.L.A. Hart has noted. Hart, Legal and Moral Obligation, in EsSAYS IN MoRAL PHILOSOPHY
106-07 (A.I. Melden ed. 1958). Here, Mill may simply be adverting to linguistic evidence rather
than to his own view. Mill elsewhere opines that the "internal sanction" of conscience is "not
innate, but acquired," UTI LIT ARIANISM at 283, which suggests that he would have agreed
that punishment by conscience is parasitic upon punishment by opinion. Mill may in fact have
regarded the view I state here as too weak; for he seems to have believed that the performance of
any genuine moral duty is compellable or, at least, that a person under a moral duty has no right
to complain if she is compelled. See id. at 304. I would not go so far.
31. I use the term "self-concerning duty" rather than the more familiar term, "self-regarding duty" because the latter invites confusion. Clarity is served by replacing the latter with a pair
of terms: a "self-concerning" duty is one whose omissions legitimately concerns no one other than
the agent who is bound; a "self-directed" duty is one having as its aim the improvement of the
actor or her lot, whether ultimately or as a means to an improved world, and whose omissions
create no correlative grievance in any other person. The two concepts are distinct because others
may have a legitimate concern even if none have a grievance. See note 29, supra, for an example.
See generally Falk, Morality, Self, and Others, in MoRALITY AND THE LANGUAGE oF CoNDUCT
25 (H.-N. Castaneda & G. Nakhnikian, eds. 1965) [hereinafter Falk]. The terminology proposed
here makes it obvious that the existence of self-directed duties in no way guarantees that selfconcerning duties exist.
32. This point echoes others made by philosophers as diverse as L. WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 94e-100e (B. McGuinness, trans. 3d ed. 1958), and G.W.F. HEGEL,
PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND at 149-60 (J.B. Baillie, trans., rev. ed. 1931).
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actor does to have a right to tell her what they think. Moreover, the
suasion and remonstrance must be of a recognizably moral strain
-they must be consistent with the assumption that they are licensed by
the fact that a moral requirement of the actor is at issue. Therefore the
"sufficient interest" on the others' part has to be understood as restricted to a subset of their legitimate interests, i.e., to those interests
that are implicated because the actor's performance of some moral requirement is at stake. "Sufficient interest" does not encompass the
larger set of legitimate interests containing what would suit the others'
preferences on some other ground, or what would comport with the
others' notions of what would merely be commendable.
An example: suppose I am walking down the street and pass a
blind man. He has dropped his cane and is groping for it. Although it
would cost me nothing to help him, I step around him and over his
cane and proceed on my way. I was observed at a distance by a person
whom I now pass. If I was morally required to give assistance (as I
think I obviously was) and the facts of the situation are evident to the
onlooker, I think the onlooker is entitled to say something like this: "I
saw what you did. It was rotten of you not to help. How would you
like it if you were in his shoes? (or "What if everybody were as callous
as you?")." Even if there is something amounting to a presumptive
moral requirement not to offer unwelcome comment to strangers on the
street, the onlooker acts properly if, but only if, the interest he takes is
in my inexcusable omission of a moral requirement. He would, on the
other hand, be a merely officious intermeddler if he were to say, "I saw
what you did and I just didn't like it. It didn't please me at all. .. " or
"Excuse me, but what you just did was hardly commendable. I don't
mean that sarcastically, because I don't think you were morally required to do otherwise. You were, in fact, morally free to do what you
did -but I don't commend you for it."
I conclude that no moral requirement can exist outside a space of
social enforcement. Wrongdoers sometimes manage to evade detection
(think of the ring of Gyges in The Republic), but even so they violate a
moral requirement just in case their conduct is of a type that is subject
to social correction when detected. Of course there are limits to permissible private suasion and chastisement, particularly where it is less than
obvious what morality requires or whether a moral requirement is at
issue. As David Falk put the point, "To say 'you ought to' to another is
always a kind of interference; and the propriety of saying so (as distinct
from having a judgment about it) varies with the case." 33 For example,
33. Falk, supra note 31 at 56 (emphasis in original).
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even those who think it obvious that a pregnant woman is morally required to take care to avoid doing harm to her unborn child would
admit that they are constrained from offering unsolicited advice to her
about her smoking or drinking. 34 In a case like this, comment can properly come only from those who are specially related to her -parent,
sibling, child, doctor, spouse, lover or a close-enough friend. In the
event that it is evident that no such person exists, or that such persons
are unwilling to give counsel, then it seems less presumptuous of a
stranger to comment.
The existence of moral limits to permissible means of enforcement
raises the question whether, within those limits, there is an additional
moral limit that debars the state from employing the very same means
available to some private person. This question is the subject of the
following section.

IV.

ARE THERE MoRAL REQUIREMENTS WHosE PERMISSIBLE

MEANS oF ENFORCEMENT ARE NoT AvAILABLE To THE STATE?

Some moral requirements are coercively enforceable by suitably
situated private persons. The law is shaped by a recognition that in
some instances what would otherwise be a battery, or worse, is justifiable by the fact that the would-be defendant acted to enforce a moral
requirement, e.g., the moral requirement that the would-be complainant refrain from violating the defendant's moral right to bodily integrity
or property. This is sometimes explained by reference to what would be
permissible in a state of nature. However we regard the matter, there
are, I think, very few instances of privately coercively enforceable moral
requirements that are not permissibly legally coercively enforceable.
Here is a possible example: suppose that all children are morally required to obey their parents' reasonable bedtime rules, and suppose
that this requirement is coercively enforceable by the parents. It could
be argued that this requirement is strongly delegalized because legal
intervention would violate moral principles that protect the integrity of
the family.
This example would be worrisome if it presented a genuine example of a moral requirement, but I don't think it does. Children are
relatively deficient in knowledge and judgment. This is why their parents are entitled to make special rules for them until they are of "suitable age and discretion." But this very same immaturity makes it odd to
say that children are morally required to follow these rules; a child
does not breach a duty or ignore a moral obligation when it ignores
34. I owe this example to Ferdie Schoenman.
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them. Not everything that is permissibly coercively enforceable is a
moral requirement incumbent upon the person who may permissibly
be coerced.
I can think of no significantly different examples, and so I conclude that any moral requirement that is coercively enforceable by a
private person is permissibly enforceable by legal coercive means. The
law exists, after all, to eliminate the hazards of a regime of private
coercion, and the law achieves this end by presuming largely to monopolize the permissible means of coercive enforcement, as Hobbes and
Locke explain. There are in fact many moral requirements that the
state and only the state may permissibly enforce by coercion, e.g., paying taxes, ceasing public nuisances.
Many moral requirements are not coercively enforceable by any
private person. The blind man example above is a probable instance.
The onlooker may permissibly chastise me, but he cannot lay hands on
me, drag me back and force me to retrieve the blind man's cane. The
question then becomes, are there suasive means of enforcement that the
state may not permissibly pursue, even though some private person
may? It seems to me that there are not, but the issue is obscured by the
fact that the state rarely is in a position to offer personalized moral
advice, and it seldom contents itself with doing so. Because the state
cannot in principle occupy certain roles, such as spouse, parent or
friend, its morally permissible suasive efforts seem to be seriously curtailed. Therefore it will be worth exploring the question: Are there
moral requirements which, though subject to permissible private suasive enforcement, are not proper subjects of coercive legal enforcement?

v.

MANY GRADES OF LEGAL INVOLVEMENT

Law affects conduct in multifarious ways. The paradigm instance
of a legal requirement is a criminal statute that makes certain conduct
punishable by imprisonment. But statutes impose fines as well as confinement, and taxes as well as fines. Paying these is a legal requirement. And the criminal law concerns not only what statutes prescribe,
but also sentencing once a violation is proven. The defendant whose
sentence may be enhanced for failure to show remorse after the fact is,
in a perfectly natural sense, being legally required to show remorse. 311
And the criminal law is not the whole of the law. Civil courts order
contracts to be performed, property to be handed over, money to be
paid, and children to be given up by their parents. To the extent that
35. See Edmundson, Liberalism, Legal Decision making, and Morality 'As Such,' forthcomOXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. (1990).
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helping out with the dishes and abstaining from profanity can properly
affect the result in a child custody suit, there is an attenuated sense in
which these things are legally required.
This messiness means that the delegalization thesis, that strongly
delegalized moral requirements exist, can be held in various forms. A
moderate form is the thesis that certain moral requirements cannot permissibly be enforced by the threat of imprisonment. An extreme form is
the thesis that certain moral requirements are strongly delegalized "all
the way down;" that is, certain moral requirements have no business
affecting any legal outcome insofar as that outcome is coercively enforceable. I will explore the extreme and moderate views in turn.
The extreme form of the thesis is not very plausible. What facts
about a moral requirement would show that its affecting any legal result would violate a moral principle, i.e., some other moral requirement? Facts about individual autonomy and integrity come to mind.
Consider the man who fails to help the blind man recover his cane. He
acts selfishly and in a way that merits censure, one might argue, but
visiting legal consequences would impermissibly impinge upon his autonomy. This answer is unsatisfactory because it appeals to the very
boundary that is at issue. Surely the man's conduct would be proper to
consider in some legal contexts -such as a child custody proceeding or
a parole hearing- and if considered it might very well determine the
outcome.
Another example: the expectant mother who smokes and drinks
despite the risks to her unborn child. A defender of the extreme view
could argue that just as a stranger could not properly comment on her
conduct, the state may not attach consequences to it. This position appeals to an analogy between the state and the officious intermeddler,
while implicitly rejecting analogies between the state and those in special roles, such as the physician. Unless this selective use of analogy can
be supported, it is question begging. Such support seems unlikely, and
in any case it is implausible to suggest that the woman's conduct could
not permissibly be taken into account in deciding, e.g., her fitness to be
a custodial parent or her entitlement to recover damages against a tobacco company or distiller for injuries to her own health. Of course the
weight such facts should be given in isolation may be slight, but it is
hard to imagine a moral barrier to their being weighed at all that is not
also a barrier to thinking them contrary to a moral requirement.
The extreme position is defensible only if at least one of the following two propositions is true: a) legal correction is per se oppressive
of liberty in a way that private correction is not, or b) legal correction,
though not different in kind from private correction, is in fact always
more oppressive. But neither is true. Legal correction can be very mild.
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The "lingering death" imposed for various offenses in imperial China
stands at the opposite extreme from, for example, the $5 parking ticket
or the 5 mil sales tax. But each is an example of an exaction imposed
by a legal system, a legal requirement. Moral suasion and remonstrance, on the other hand, can be very harsh. The sermon on hell in A
Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man is a good example of the extremes to which moral suasion can be carried, and The Scarlet Letter of
the extreme possibilities of remonstrance. 88 I find it difficult to believe
that imposing a fine of $5 for each failure to render aid to the blind
man in circumstances like those described is inherently more offensive
to one's liberty, integrity or privacy than the suasion and remonstrance
that is licensed in virtue of the fact that one has acted contrary to a
moral requirement. A violator might well prefer to pay the $5 and be
spared the "moral reprobation . . . retribution and punishment" of
which Mill spoke.
It could be argued that legal correction fails to respect the agent as
an autonomous being, unlike private suasive correction, which essentially constitutes an appeal to the agent in her capacity as rational
chooser. This argument proves too much if it means that the threat of
legal correction precludes free choice. Anyone who has ever driven on a
highway knows this to be false. Moreover, it is unclear why a criminal
statute cannot be understood to be both an appeal to the citizen's moral
sense and a threat. As Mill points out, moral suasion may involve
"moral reprobation ... retribution and punishment," without ceasing
to be an appeal to us in our capacity as rational actors.
Perhaps it could be argued that although the fine may not be so
oppressive as to preclude free choice, it is inherently more objectionable
than suasion because the actor cannot exercise virtue -or act morally
in a Kantian sense- by complying with the threat the fine represents.
But this argument assumes that an actor's conduct is morally worthy
only to the extent that her choice is unaffected (consciously or otherwise) by its consequences for her. If that is so, why should it matter
whether the constraining consequences are legal or merely social in
nature?
Mill's observation about social enforcement bears repeating here:
although merely moral requirements are "not usually upheld by such
extreme penalties" as legal requirements are, private suasive enforce36. Hester Prynne was of course legally required to wear the scarlet letter but, in itself, the
letter was only marginally more burdensome than the garment to which it was sewn. The efficacy
of legal punishment depended on its stimulating private means of enforcement that would in perhaps lesser degree have been used anyway. There are indications in the text that the legal punishment forestalled even more drastic private measures.
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ment "leaves fewer means of escape, penetrat[es] much more deeply
into the details of life, and enslav[es] the soul itself." These differences
can be explained. If we consider the perceived extremity of a sanction
to be equal to its actual extremity discounted by the probability the
actor assigns to its occurrence, any given degree of perceived extremity
can be attained either by combining a low probability of "conviction"
with an extreme penalty, or by combining a higher probability of conviction with a lesser penalty. Social rather than legal enforcement may
be attractive because it combines relatively low administrative costs
(e.g., police, courts, etc.) with a relatively high probability of conviction.
Thus, social enforcement may not only deliver a given level of perceived
extremity of sanction at a lower administrative cost, it may do so by
employing less extreme penalties. 37
Mill points out that private suasive correction is not only intrusive,
it can erode the spontaneity of individual choice more surely and more
extensively than any concern on the agent's part to avoid mild or remote legal consequences. There are of course moral and even legal limits to the extent and nature of suasive correction. Officious intermeddling is morally impermissible, and suasion or remonstrance that lapses
into harangue or harassment is also impermissible. But, at least as to
the latter, these limits are diffuse and wide. No matter how much we
may relish abstract discussion, only the sturdiest and most self-certain
of us are likely to remain unmoved and unbothered by the more strenuous forms of permissible suasion and complaint where our actual, impending or completed practical decisions are at issue.
Mill held that private suasive correction, unlike legal repression,
can "enslav[e] the soul itself." We can understand this as a reminder
that the boundary between self and state is much harder to confound
than the boundary between soul and soulmates. Heretics, for example,
so typically form subcultures in which heresy is orthodoxy that it is
reasonable to view such associations as practically necessary to the very
maintenance of heresy. Moreover, it is hard to imagine how an individual could, without lapsing into pathology, persevere in any course of
37. For a discussion of the dynamics of the choice between public and private enforcement
through the legal system, and of the factors that govern the choice between different combinations
of severity and probability to achieve a given expected cost to the criminal, see R. PosNER, EcoNOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW ch. 7, 22 (3d ed. 1986). Posner argues that the problem of the insolvent
defendant largely accounts for the great degree to which criminal law relies on nonpecuniary
penal sanctions rather than tort remedies to achieve its ends. See id. at 205, 209, and cf Becker &
Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 1
(1975) (proposing that criminal prosecution be wholly private). For an historical account of a
regime combining extreme penalties and private prosecution, see D. HAY, P. LINEBAUGH, J.
RULE, E. THOMPSON & C. WINSLOW, ALBION'S FATAL TREE: CRIME AND SOCIETY IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND (1975).
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conduct that was universally thought wicked, whether or not it was
illegal. Pace Kant and Rawls, we are not noumenal egos. We know
ourselves through our associations and our understandings of how we
are as others know us. 88 A barrier to legal correction alone would leave
the individual's identity, as well as her liberty, exposed to potentially
devastating social assaults.
Following Mill, we can conceptualize every instance of social control as an ordered quadruple whose values are a severity measure, an
avoidability measure, a pervasiveness measure and a measure of the
effect upon individuality. These measures are comparable and additive
(let's pretend) and yield a measure of the total burden upon liberty of
any given means of social control. Typically, civil penalties exceed private suasive methods in the severity measure, but not in the others. On
Mill's view, then, for any private suasive means of enforcement there
exists a conceivable, less burdensome state-imposed coercive means.
Therefore, if Mill is generally correct, there will always be a possible,
state-imposed coercive means of enforcement that is less offensive, on
balance, than any given private, suasive means.
Legal correction is often less intrusive than the least intrusive
morally permissible, available form of private suasive correction. Suppose I am driving on a public highway with my young children. I am
driving carelessly but cause no actual harm, and suppose my driving
this way violates a moral requirement. Suppose that another private
person observes my driving and perceives that it created a sufficiently
great risk of harm to him to give him a moral permission to complain,
to me, about it. In these circumstances the least intrusive suasive correction available to him might be something like following me, catching up
with me, waving me over and complaining -politely- about my driving; in others words, doing what the nicest police officer would do in
the circumstances. My suspicion is that most of us would find this considerably more galling than being cautioned or even ticketed by the police. And more than galling -humiliating, infuriating, baffling and
discombobulating. In a word -intrusive. 39
VI.

Is CRIMINAL PuNISHMENT DIFFERENT? FEINBERG's

VIEw

The extreme view seems untenable, but the moderate view may
not be. The extreme view is vulnerable because it forbids any legal
38. On this subject, see generally M. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THf: LIMITS OF jUSTICE
(1982).
39. A popular automobile bumper-sticker reads: "Don't like my driving? Dial 1-800-EATSHIT." The idea behind this might be translated: "If my driving isn't bad enough to call forth
legal correction, then no one has a right to complain about it."
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consequence to attach to certain forms of immoral conduct. The moderate view does not forbid all legal consequences to attach, but only those
of a certain type, i.e., imprisonment or corporal or capital punishment.
The moderate view thus seems more reasonable; after all, imprisonment seems importantly different from other burdens that the state may
impose on us. But, looking behind this appearance, what separates regulation from punishment? Unless some principled distinction between
regulation and criminalization can be drawn, every example of permissible regulatory enforcement of a moral requirement is a problem for
the moderate version of the delegalization thesis.
Joel Feinberg offers a principled basis for such a distinction in his
essay, "The Expressive Function of Punishment." 40 According to Feinberg, punishment needs to be understood as distinct from mere penalty.
Penalties include such things as "parking tickets, offside penalties,
sackings, flunkings and disqualifications" while "imprisonment at hard
labor for committing a felony" is an example of a punishment." 1 Feinberg rejects the idea that the distinction can rest on severity alone, even
though penalties typically are the less severe; and he rejects the idea
that penalties can be characterized as "retroactive licensing fees" in
contrast to punishments, which are not." 2 Rather, Feinberg differentiates the genus of "authoritative deprivations for failures" -to which
both punishments and penalties belong- according to an "important
additional characteristic" common and peculiar to punishments." 3 This
40. Collected in j. FEINBERG, DOING AND DESERVING at 95-118 (1970) [hereinafter "The
Expressive Function"].
41. /d. at 96.
42. /d. at 97. Robert Cooter points out that the difference between prices and sanctions
(roughly, between penalties and punishments, in Feinberg's terminology) can also be understood
in terms of effect. See Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 Cot.UM. L. REv. 1523 (1984). Sanctions
typically increase in abrupt fashion as the actor passes from a permitted to a forbidden level of
activity, whereas prices do not. If in Mill's time governments were generally more given to sanctioning than to pricing, then his observation that legal requirements are typically upheld by "more
extreme penalties" can be understood as referring not only to the relative severity of legal enforcement, but also to the fact that the abruptness with which the law responds to incremental increases in activity level stands in contrast to the more continuous nature of social enforcement. We
are capable of expressing social disapprobation in nearly continuous fashion -think of the gradually raised eyebrow- whereas legal sanctions (as opposed to prices) tend to jump at one in a more
extreme-seeming (because abrupt) way.
43. "The Expressive Function" at 97-98. Feinberg rightly dismisses the idea that the distinction between punishments and penalties can be based on degree of severity. See id. at 96. In a
similar vein, David Luban dismisses the idea that the law can consistently grant an indigent a
right to appointed counsel in a criminal case while denying her a right to appointed counsel in
civil litigation. See D. LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE at 261-62 (1988). Such a difference cannot
be justified, Luban argues, by appeal to any presumed primacy of physical liberty over pecuniary
interests. /d. at 262.
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characteristic is what Feinberg calls "a certain expressive function."""
Punishment, he argues, "is a conventional device for the expression of
attitudes of resentment and indignation, and of judgments of disapproval and reprobation, on the part either of the punishing authority
himself [sic] or of those 'in whose name' the punishment is inflicted.""1
If Feinberg can establish that a criminal legal requirement is
backed by a threat (viz. of punishment, rather than mere penalty) that
is different in kind from what backs a merely regulatory legal requirement, then there is a way to maintain the moderate version of the delegalization thesis. The advocate of the moderate view will admit that
moral requirements may permissibly become regulatory legal requirements, but she will deny that all moral requirements may permissibly
become criminal legal requirements. She will be able to do this by exploiting the discontinuity between penalties and punishments. She will
admit that for each private suasive enforcement measure there exists a
possible, less oppressive regulatory legal enforcement measure; but she
will deny that there always exists a possible, less oppressive criminal
legal enforcement measure. She can do this because every criminal legal
enforcement measure will carry a special characteristic not shared by
its otherwise equally severe regulatory counterparts -namely, the symbolic stigma.
Can this work? It is true that regulatory legal requirements do not
generally independently constitute moral requirements, and it is true
that to add a "symbolic stigma" to what would otherwise be a mere
regulatory offense (a mere malum prohibitum) is to attach a consequence different in kind from mere penalty. But the delegalization thesis concerns types of conduct that are supposed already to be morally
required, and whose omission is therefore already necessarily stigmatized. And so what criminalizing the omission of a moral requirement
adds is not indignation or a judgment that a type of conduct is morally
wrong, for those must already_ have existed.
Criminalizing the omission of a moral requirement changes two
things. It creates a coercive remedy where, possibly, no morally permissible private coercive remedy had existed. And it expresses the state's
remonstrance in addition to the necessarily permissible private remonstrance that otherwise exists. The first change is not necessarily different from the change that would be brought about by regulating the
omission, and there is reason to doubt that any moral requirement can
44. "The Expressive Function" at 98.
45. /d. Mill argued that "the chief mischief of the legal penalties [imposed on unpopular
belief] is that they strengthen the social stigma ... which is [what is J really effective . . . . " ON
LIBERTY at 39.
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be morally immune from regulatory enforcement. The second change
adds to -but does not originate- the category of those who may permissibly remonstrate with the offender for his omission. Therefore the
necessary minimum net difference between regulating and criminalizing is the addition of the state to the category of those who may permissibly remonstrate. The moderate version of the delegalization thesis is
tenable only if it is plausible to hold that there is a moral principle that
makes it impermissible for the state to remonstrate about the omission
of some (but of course not all) moral requirements.
The inquiry has come full circle. Above, at the end of section IV, I
suggested that because particularized state suasive enforcement is often
unavailable, it would be necessary to examine whether the state could
permissibly enforce, by its typically coercive mechanisms, moral requirements that no private person was free to enforce coercively. In
section V, I gave an affirmative answer to this question with respect to
regulatory coercion, leaving only the question whether there are principled grounds to believe that criminal punishment cannot be employed
to enforce at least some moral requirements. Now, it appears that the
search for an answer to this question returns us to the earlier one: Is it
ever morally improper for the state suasively to enforce a moral
requirement?
Above, I noted that the class of those who may permissibly remonstrate with a person about her omission of a moral requirement is
sometimes limited. I also suggested, though, that circumstances may operate to open this class; for example, when no one occupies the roles
that ordinarily carry such a permission. Like it or not, we see that the
state is often the only dependable inheritor of these roles when -as
increasingly happens- they fall vacant. Their having responsible tenants is at best a contingent matter, and the circumstance that they
often do have responsible tenants cannot be a basis for strongly delegalizing any moral requirement.
There is no denying that criminal punishments are typically more
severe than regulatory penalties, and typically more burdensome upon
liberty than private suasive enforcement measures. But it is likewise
true that private coercive enforcement is more severe than suasion. A
perhaps nebulous idea of proportionality governs both legal and private
enforcement. The moderate version of the delegalization thesis is interesting only if it holds that some moral requirement enforceable by private means of overall burdensomeness b is not enforceable by criminal
legal means having an overall burdensomeness of b or less; but holding
this seems unreasonable. The moderate version cannot be defended by
appealing to the fact that we would object to the state's locking up the
petty malefactor and throwing away the key; we would likewise object
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to any private person's doing this. What counts is what others do to the
individual and, as Mill saw, whether what is done is done privately or
by law makes no fundamental difference.

VII.

CONCLUSION

In the pluralistic, complicated and increasingly fragmented world
we inhabit, there are good reasons to refer to the state a greater-thantraditional share of the task of moral correction. For one thing, private
correction is less reliable than it may have been when ties of family,
religion and community were stronger. For another, private correction
can be irregular, unfair, scary, risky and invasive. State responsibility
for moral oversight may on balance be to the benefit of those overseen;
whether it is or is not cannot be settled a priori.
Mill's fears of social tyranny have not, in the United States at
least, been realized. 46 What Mill did not and perhaps could not foresee
was the degree to which mobility and urbanization have eroded the
bases both of social enforcement and of the reflective consensus that
moral requirements presuppose. To the extent that social tyranny appears less of a threat than Mill envisaged, legal tyranny appears more
of one. This fact has made it tempting to recast Mill's doctrine as one
defining the limits of law alone, or of criminal law alone, rather than a
limit to social control generally. I have tried to show that this is a
mistake.
To grant that something is a moral requirement is to authorize
some means of social enforcement. To those of us who find popular
notions of morality too narrow, it may be tempting to ignore the
"moral" point in order to concentrate our forces at the perimeter of the
law. This gambit leaves the legitimacy of social enforcement unchallenged, but the thought may be that this can be readily evaded; and that
the cost of contesting the moral territory is too high. However sound
this might be as a forensic strategy, I think it is untenable in theory.
It is easy to picture morality divided into an outer sphere and an
inner sphere. Morality is not offended if the state helps police the outer
sphere, but the inner sphere is another matter. The law cannot enter
here; morality itself forbids it, and forbids it absolutely, not as a mere
matter of policy. This is a powerful, if inaccurate, picture. Because of
its power, it is hard to resist using this image when the legislature
threatens to penalize what is morally innocent. Appealing to this picture may help block bad legislation while finessing the politically very
46. As Sir Isaiah Berlin tersely puts it, "Mill had scarcely any prophetic gift." FouR EssAYS
183 (1970).
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bloody debate about what is and is not morally blameworthy. The perfect coincidence view rejects this seductive and expedient picture. It
may be that the perfect coincidence view should remain an esoteric doctrine -rather as Sidgwick thought utilitarianism should be- until the
passions the privacy debate has stirred recede.

